MNB Has Limited Scope for Further Loosening in November
Following S&P’s similar decision in late August, Fitch Ratings improved the outlook on its BBB- sovereign long-term debt rating to Positive from Stable in early November. Previously, Moody’s refrained from touching its own Baa3/Stable rating in late October. So Hungary has just won a 2-1 vote to move one little step further up the rating ladder, towards the inner regions of the world of investment-grade issuers. We agree with most of what Fitch said on Hungary’s achievements, but we would be tougher on the risks the country faces. And even Fitch stated clearly that an eventual upgrade would require further improvement, both in structural policies and in financial performance.
Now that Mme Merkel is preoccupied with forging a government coalition in Germany, European Council decision-making seems to have temporarily decelerated. But backstage, preparations are proceeding to introduce a compulsory and permanent refugee relocation scheme within the EU, and to change the structure and the rules of the EU budget for 2021-2027. Both sets of proposals are moving in a way unfavorable for Hungary. A new round of PM Orbán’s "national consultations", a domestic campaign against EU migration policy, raised eyebrows high in the European Parliament. But once again, Western European discontent with Mr. Orbán’s behavior does not appear to be immediately consequential. Meanwhile, October’s parliamentary elections in Austria and the Czech Republic reflected a distinct shift towards the radical right in terms of voters’ increasing rejection of the mass import of third-world refugees. Even though the new stars of CEE politics are not necessarily the closest friends of Hungary’s government, their election has probably made PM Orbán’s political isolation in Europe much more difficult than it looked previously.
Somewhat curiously, Fidesz made significant gains in opinion polls in October, recovering almost to the level of support it enjoyed at the time of the latest local government elections exactly three years ago. It appears that Mr. Orbán’s harsh anti-migrant rhetoric plays well, especially in the countryside and among the elderly. In addition, recent announcements about a moderate hike and a one-off "bonus" payment granted to old-age pensioners also appear popular. On the side of the leftist-liberal opposition, the Socialists (MSzP) and the pro-European Democratic Coalition (DK) at last agreed to cooperate in the April election, and they intend to draw in three additional minor parties. This is a necessary and logical step but it remains far short of what would be needed to overcome Fidesz in the vote.
GDP growth accelerated moderately in Q3, with apparently little change in its structure. The economy is marching towards 3.8-3.9% GDP growth in full-year 2017, which exceeds most recent market forecasts but falls a bit short of the government’s optimistic prediction. Industrial output growth remained unchanged from Q2, buoyed equally by the robust upswing in European manufacturing and by strengthening domestic sales. Construction continued its exceptionally strong trend seen already in H1, driven by massive government spending, in a great part under EU-backed development programs, and a sharp upturn in housing construction. Growth was mainly propelled by domestic demand, including rapid, but roughly unchanged, consumption growth and an explosion of fixed investment that followed last year’s debacle in the same area. Imports are growing faster than exports in both nominal and real terms, but the difference has not been big enough so far to cause any significant deterioration in the external trade balance.
In accrual terms, the general government had a small surplus once again in January-September, substantially better than the annual fiscal target. But even so, the deterioration of the central government’s cash balance has grown into a borderline case between business as usual and potentially problematic. We only partially accept the government’s explanation that eventually everything will be all right, as the now very large amounts paid out under EU programs but not yet reimbursed by Brussels will translate into claims on the EU in their books run by ESA-2010. In fact, the short-term pressure put on budget financing is increasingly evident. The gross debt ratio could be kept on its decreasing trend only through some depletion of government deposits so far this year. It is an open question if achieving the official disbursement target by end-2017 can be done without putting the central government’s liquidity at risk if no further proceeds are collected from the European Union in the meantime. And the latter is a risk item as well, judging by the dissatisfaction of the EU Commission with the distribution and controlling mechanisms run by Hungary.
Another item to explain regarding fiscal events is the most recent poor showing of central government revenue, which fell by more than one-fifth in year-on-year terms in September, after following a strong trend earlier in 2017. We traced that event back to two factors, including almost no reimbursements from the EU in that month, and the shortening of the deadline for VAT refund payments for non-problematic taxpayers, following a respective EU rule. The effect of the first factor is believed to be largely temporary, but its existence could easily extend well beyond the current year. The impact of the latter factor should be permanent but affect 2017 flows alone.
The October inflation data seems just perfect from the MNB’s point of view, as both the headline rate and four core inflation rates fell in year-on-year terms – only non-fuel inflation remained unchanged from September. In a short-term view, this appears to have vindicated the Bank, which previously predicted exactly that, i.e. that inflation would decrease towards the end of 2017. In fact, inflation did not decelerate in October, and the yoy drop was due to an outstanding base effect only. On the negative side, core inflation remains at near-target level, labor market conditions are slowly deteriorating and as prices in agriculture, industry, construction and housing show, inflation is more significant in a number of non-consumer areas. Regarding CPI-inflation, base effects will remain friendly to the MNB’s cause until February, and turn more hostile only after that. But in the immediate future, the Bank had better keep an eye on the impact of recent forint weakening, rising oil prices and the renewed strength of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro.
In terms of policy, the authorities appear to be relaxed about inflation prospects. At least that can be read from a recent government statement that no administrative reduction of public utility prices is currently on the agenda, even though "firm rumors" suggest that there has been preliminary consideration given to this idea, in case inflation threatens to go undesirably high. At the next Monetary Council meeting, on November 21, further loosening is likely to be announced, most probably through some innovation in the Bank’s favorite area of non-conventional tools. However, as usual in recent times, there is likely to be more smoke than fire, with little actual monetary impact. This is because the remaining scope for monetary loosening is indeed limited, and although the MNB seems optimistic, it has appeared to be far from reckless as yet.
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